Comments on: Misperceiving pain (and God) http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/ Philosophy through multiple traditions Thu, 09 Feb 2012 21:23:56 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1 By: elisa freschi http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-620 elisa freschi Thu, 19 Nov 2009 11:11:53 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-620 Amod: thanks for pointing out that you also do not believe in neurological response as being totally exhaustive in regard to the perception of pain. As for your first remark, you are right, we seem to be using two different senses of "perception", which leads me to what Michael wrote. Michael: Thanks for your careful analysis. Still, I would rather say that my point is that the external object does not exactly correspond to the content of our perceptions. To name just one of Russell's examples: we cannot deny that we *perceive* something elliptic while looking at a coin from a certain angle, although the coin has never ceased to be round. Amod: thanks for pointing out that you also do not believe in neurological response as being totally exhaustive in regard to the perception of pain. As for your first remark, you are right, we seem to be using two different senses of “perception”, which leads me to what Michael wrote.
Michael: Thanks for your careful analysis. Still, I would rather say that my point is that the external object does not exactly correspond to the content of our perceptions. To name just one of Russell’s examples: we cannot deny that we *perceive* something elliptic while looking at a coin from a certain angle, although the coin has never ceased to be round.

]]> By: Amod Lele http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-617 Amod Lele Wed, 18 Nov 2009 23:04:35 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-617 The distinction between the content and object is definitely what's at issue here - I'm not sure that's the best terminology, but I understand what you mean. We are using "perceive" in two different senses, in a sense, on either side of a theory of error. When I see something that is really a rope but that I think is a snake, what am I perceiving: the rope or the snake? As far as I can tell, you're arguing for the snake and I'm arguing for the rope. So are we just arguing a semantic point about the definition of the word "perceive" - whether the object of the verb should be the content or the object of perception? Perhaps, although I suspect there's something deeper still going on as well. I agree that "purely objective" measures such as neurological response are not adequate arbiters of subjective experiences like pain. We can expect that, when someone has certain neurological reactions associated with pain, s/he will be experiencing pain as well, but the neurological reactions do not constitute the pain. Pain itself has a nonphysical dimension, in that respect. The distinction between the content and object is definitely what’s at issue here – I’m not sure that’s the best terminology, but I understand what you mean. We are using “perceive” in two different senses, in a sense, on either side of a theory of error. When I see something that is really a rope but that I think is a snake, what am I perceiving: the rope or the snake? As far as I can tell, you’re arguing for the snake and I’m arguing for the rope. So are we just arguing a semantic point about the definition of the word “perceive” – whether the object of the verb should be the content or the object of perception? Perhaps, although I suspect there’s something deeper still going on as well.

I agree that “purely objective” measures such as neurological response are not adequate arbiters of subjective experiences like pain. We can expect that, when someone has certain neurological reactions associated with pain, s/he will be experiencing pain as well, but the neurological reactions do not constitute the pain. Pain itself has a nonphysical dimension, in that respect.

]]> By: michael reidy http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-609 michael reidy Sun, 15 Nov 2009 20:05:12 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-609 Elisa, Thanks. Amod may have his own demurring to do but mine is briefly this. You appear to be saying that what we perceive are our perceptions and not the supposed object. Is this just in the case of noumenal experience or does this apply to perception in general? Elisa,
Thanks. Amod may have his own demurring to do but mine is briefly this. You appear to be saying that what we perceive are our perceptions and not the supposed object. Is this just in the case of noumenal experience or does this apply to perception in general?

]]> By: elisa freschi http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-608 elisa freschi Sun, 15 Nov 2009 12:52:38 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-608 Amod 1 (about the post): You know the Indian simile about the 100 lotus-petals. If one pierces them all, one would think that they have been peirced all at once. In fact, however, there is a sequence, but the petals are so close to each other that one runs the risk not to perceive it. Similarly, Teresa d'Avila does PERCEIVE God, although this does not mean that the object of her perception is 'God'. It just mean that she has a perception about God, nothing else. Later, after her vision, she might claim that she has seen the historical Jesus Christ, etc., but this was not part of her perception. Similarly, in the case of a child who claims to have seen a ghost, he might be mistaken since what he perceived was not an externally existing ghost, but he is not not mistaken in claiming that the object of his (illusory, we might argue) perception was a ghost. (To be more explicit about the lotus-simile: I have the feeling that you do not distinguish between object and content of perception. The two might be the same, but ought not, else we could not explain common-sense sentences such as "I bumped into a chair [in the dark]". At least, I think you should not *assume* that they are the same.) As for pain, thanks for your interesting remarks in your comment (about the failure of emphatetic imagination) and about the oblivion of a more intense pain. This makes me think that physiotherapists before asking questions should 'help' their patients in remembering past painful experiences. Still, after all that, what is left is that *we* are the ultimate authority about our painful experience (for one, a jellyfish bite might be more painful than giving birth, for another, herpes zoster would be even worse etc.). What I mean is just that there is no external criterion (such as neurological response), Michael: thanks for putting it so nicely! Amod 1 (about the post): You know the Indian simile about the 100 lotus-petals. If one pierces them all, one would think that they have been peirced all at once. In fact, however, there is a sequence, but the petals are so close to each other that one runs the risk not to perceive it. Similarly, Teresa d’Avila does PERCEIVE God, although this does not mean that the object of her perception is ‘God’. It just mean that she has a perception about God, nothing else. Later, after her vision, she might claim that she has seen the historical Jesus Christ, etc., but this was not part of her perception. Similarly, in the case of a child who claims to have seen a ghost, he might be mistaken since what he perceived was not an externally existing ghost, but he is not not mistaken in claiming that the object of his (illusory, we might argue) perception was a ghost. (To be more explicit about the lotus-simile: I have the feeling that you do not distinguish between object and content of perception. The two might be the same, but ought not, else we could not explain common-sense sentences such as “I bumped into a chair [in the dark]“. At least, I think you should not *assume* that they are the same.)
As for pain, thanks for your interesting remarks in your comment (about the failure of emphatetic imagination) and about the oblivion of a more intense pain. This makes me think that physiotherapists before asking questions should ‘help’ their patients in remembering past painful experiences. Still, after all that, what is left is that *we* are the ultimate authority about our painful experience (for one, a jellyfish bite might be more painful than giving birth, for another, herpes zoster would be even worse etc.). What I mean is just that there is no external criterion (such as neurological response),
Michael: thanks for putting it so nicely!

]]> By: Amod Lele http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-603 Amod Lele Sat, 14 Nov 2009 01:35:10 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-603 There is something intersubjective about the experience of a toothache: since we have had one, we have some sense of what it is probably like for others to have one. I was trying to get at this with my point about empathy above, and on reflection I'm not sure I went far enough with it. I can see that, for other people who react to toothaches similarly to the way I do, sticking their hand in a flame produces a much stronger reaction. So I can infer that the burnt hand is more painful than the toothache even if I have never experienced it. If I think that the minor pain is the worst pain I have experienced, it is probably due to a failure of empathetic imagination. There is something intersubjective about the experience of a toothache: since we have had one, we have some sense of what it is probably like for others to have one. I was trying to get at this with my point about empathy above, and on reflection I’m not sure I went far enough with it. I can see that, for other people who react to toothaches similarly to the way I do, sticking their hand in a flame produces a much stronger reaction. So I can infer that the burnt hand is more painful than the toothache even if I have never experienced it. If I think that the minor pain is the worst pain I have experienced, it is probably due to a failure of empathetic imagination.

]]> By: michael reidy http://loveofallwisdom.com/2009/11/misperceiving-pain-and-god/comment-page-1/#comment-598 michael reidy Thu, 12 Nov 2009 13:41:58 +0000 http://loveofallwisdom.com/?p=657#comment-598 Two aspects are at play here in my view, one a Wittgensteinian critique of the subjective experience as a basis for the establishment of concepts and the other a Wittgensteinian balking at the total dismissal of the private. "It is not a something and not a nothing either."(P.I. 304) W's class used to be called the 'toothache class' and taking that as a hint I think our experience of toothache can be used as an index of pain. Most of us have experienced toothache so it is intelligible to ask whether our pain has the same level of discomfort as a bad toothache. In the Wittgenstein world that does not have to degenerate into infinite regress because it is fitted to its locus i.e. subjective but something. That subjective-but-something applied to mystical experience brings in its train the notion of wisdom. Did the transverberation of Saint Teresa alter her characteristic judgements and insight? Thereafter was she capable of surprising herself? Would a certain spontaneous flash of intuition cause her to exclaim - where did that come from? God experience alters you, indeed it must alter you or it wasn't God. The concept of God realisation of the Vedic tradition is even clearer on this point. Elisa: A rational apodeictic demonstration would be trumped by the personal experience of a saint. Sankara would agree with that because in his view no rational demonstration of the existence of God is possible. That leaves us with the self-validation of God-realisation and we are back again with the concept of wisdom. Is Saint Teresa a discerner of souls, a staretz, a sage etc. The converging evidence of multiple subjectivities suggests that she was. Two aspects are at play here in my view, one a Wittgensteinian critique of the subjective experience as a basis for the establishment of concepts and the other a Wittgensteinian balking at the total dismissal of the private.
“It is not a something and not a nothing either.”(P.I. 304) W’s class used to be called the ‘toothache class’ and taking that as a hint I think our experience of toothache can be used as an index of pain. Most of us have experienced toothache so it is intelligible to ask whether our pain has the same level of discomfort as a bad toothache. In the Wittgenstein world that does not have to degenerate into infinite regress because it is fitted to its locus i.e. subjective but something.

That subjective-but-something applied to mystical experience brings in its train the notion of wisdom. Did the transverberation of Saint Teresa alter her characteristic judgements and insight? Thereafter was she capable of surprising herself? Would a certain spontaneous flash of intuition cause her to exclaim – where did that come from? God experience alters you, indeed it must alter you or it wasn’t God. The concept of God realisation of the Vedic tradition is even clearer on this point.

Elisa:
A rational apodeictic demonstration would be trumped by the personal experience of a saint. Sankara would agree with that because in his view no rational demonstration of the existence of God is possible. That leaves us with the self-validation of God-realisation and we are back again with the concept of wisdom. Is Saint Teresa a discerner of souls, a staretz, a sage etc. The converging evidence of multiple subjectivities suggests that she was.

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